WE NEED TO RETHINK WHAT WE ARE DOING IN AFGHANISTAN
Barack Obama and progressives were correct to say that the war in Afghanistan was a necessary war because Al Qaeda’s headquarters are there or in nearby northwest Pakistan. The problem is that it was the necessary war in 2003, but the situation has since spun out of control. It is no longer the necessary war. It has spun too far out of control. President Obama's "surge" has tripled the number of US troops there, but it is accompl;ishing little.
The surge was to buy time to establish honest, effective government in urban areas and to recruit and train militia. Neither effort has been successful. President Karzai is still complaining because the US wants him to root out corruption. If the corruption does not end and the regime cannot win over the populace by providing a multiplicity of services, nothing the US attempts will work.
People in the urban areas want the US forced to do the policing. There are no signs that the Afghan police are reformed or reformable.
An unspoken oblective was to buy time so that the Pakistanis could begin to deal with those Taliban forces in Pakistan who also enter Afghanistan. So far the Pakis have only dealt with the Taliban foces that are giving them trouble. There are many reports that the Pakis are unhappy with stepped-up intelligence efforts there.
The time has come for the administration to gradually educate the public on the grim situation we face there and to point out the davantages of the Biden strategy, which was rejected last year. Americans need an open and full discussion of the unpromising situation in Afghanistan, and the Obama administration needs to set very limited objectives. The public needs to know that the situation in Afghanistan is far worse and complicated than that in Iraq.
The regime we installed in Kabul is a vast kleptocracy, that is despised by the people. There was so much talk about helping the country on to the path of democracy and modernity. Now they execute people for converting to Christianity, and the role of women has only improved slightly. War lords regained power in the provinces, and narcofarmers and others restored the poppy crop that the Taliban outlawed. A reinvigorated Taliban now taxes the crop. Forget about nation-building there.
There has been a revival of the Taliban, and the new Taliban are not just seminarians; they are rebels of all sorts, bandits, and ethnic rebels. They effectively employ roadside bombs, suicide bombers and other Iraqi tactics. Once seemingly revived by the ISI, the Pakistani Intelligence agency, or by rogue elements within it, the Afghan Taliban recently have begun working in concert with Taliban from the tribal areas of northwest Pakistan. These elements now take on Pakistani forces and Afghan forces in small formations of 500 or 600. President Hamid Karzai has offered to open talks with Mullah Omar, but the Taliban leader did not respond affirmatively.
Now there are tribal insurgencies in the south that the Karzai regime cannot contain. In all, there are fourteen important insurgent organizations in Afghanistan. The country is a little over half Pashtuns ( which includes the Taliban), and other large groups re the Uzbeks, Hazaras, and Tajiks. Warlords are the traditional leaders, and they are now fighting over control of the drug trade.
The situation there now has so deteriorated that it cannot be greatly improved by the application of American military might. We have shown that the application of masssive force can inspire the Taliban to evacuate an area. But it is also clear that they will return as soon as we leave.
Afghanistan has all the ingredients of a major military disaster. There is no silver bullet military solution; the rugged terrain is a guerilla’s paradise. Remember the British experience there in the late 19th century and the Russian military’s meltdown there in the 1980s. There are multiple factions, unbelievable geographical obstacles, and very tough logistical hurdles. American abuse of detainees and bombings has turned much of the population against us. Obama correctly noted the counterproductive effects of the bombings.
Our NATO allies are becoming discouraged and impatient, and their continued presence cannot be expected. We need to persuade NATO to remain longer and to consider introducing troops from Muslim nations, such as Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, and Algeria. There are ominous signs of discontent among the German troops.
Long-term pacification would take between 200,000 and 400,000 troops over a ten year period. The allies will not remain there that long. It is almost impossible to imagine how this option could carried out.
Our goal cannot extend much beyond buying enough time to do some more damage to Aq Qaeda in Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban. The best approach would be address it as part of a regional diplomatic effort that would bring greatly improve relations between India and Pakistan, give Afghanistan a coalition government, and to quietly continue efforts to mend our relations with Iran, who is in a position to see that our withdrawal from Afghanistan would be very painful.
Twice we missed the opportunity to get rid of President Karzai. Now he is calling us the occupiers and has even threatened to join the Taliban. Peter Galbraith, who exposed the recently stolen election there, is now saying it is possible that the Afghan prewsident is on drugs. This is the man we are betting on!
If the US plans to remain much longer, it must find a way to replace Hamid Karzai with someone more acceptable to Pakistan, who almost inevitably will plan a major role in Afghan affairs. This optimum solution would require some help from Russia, China, and the “stans.”
The ideal regional solution may well not be possible, and the US may have to settle for simply weakening the insurgencies enough to allow what passes for a central government to keep security manageable. Warlords must be bought off and not be rearmed. Far more Afghan troops must be recruited and trained. on to Kabul.
While we are there in reinforced numbers, American special forces can use the secret base the US is building in Pakistan to launch multiple operations against Al Qaeda. It should not be used for attacks by Americans against Taliban forces in northwestern Pakistan. It is paramount that we avoid creating supporters for AL Qaeda. Clearly, it would benefit if the US prolonged its presence in Iraq and Afghanistan. Continuing the level of bombings that injure civilians is also a way of creating more Al Qaeda recruits. We are now seeing signs of closer ties between Al Qaeda and the Taliban—something experts thought could not happen. The US must find ways to avoid bringing them together.
It also must be kept in mind that Pakistan is an even greater problem—prone to violence and instability. We must do nothing to destabilize her more. Pakistan faces a radical Islamic insurgency and there is the remote possibility that nuclear weapons and/or the technology of A.Q. Khan could fall into the hands of Wahabi radicals. Pakistan has a strategic reason to gain the upper hand in Afghanistan, as it needs influence in that country as part of its regional strategy of counterbalancing India. For that reason we have to assume that the ISI, or elements within it, are assisting the Taliban. There will be no increase in stability until Pakistan gets what it wants there.
Some European writers complain that the Afghan national forces are rarely used in the south, where most of the Taliban is. It is also said that there is very little coordination between allied forces and Pakistani forces on the other side of the border. Brits complain that the US might want them out of their old sphere of influence in Pashtun country. They suggest that the US wants to continue the instability there so it can use Afghanistan as a base for continuing US influence in Central Asia. It is probably more likely that the Afghan national army is simply not ready. As for dreams of being a Central Asian power— we should look at our finances, manpower problems, and the logistical difficulties of keeping a large force there over an extended period.
Dreams of greatly expanding US power in Central Asia are unrealistic. To obtain assistance from Russia and China in bringing a settlement to Afghanistan, the US must reconsider its plans to disrupt the Collective Security Treat Organization (CSTO), led by Russia, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Given our present economic circumstances, there are strong reasons to work out an amicable arrangement with the China-led SCO. The price for Russia’s help might be pulling back on NATO membership for Georgia, a move many of our allies would applaud. In both cases, there should be ways to see that the US gets its share of Caspian energy.
Showing posts with label Afghan War. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Afghan War. Show all posts
Sunday, April 25, 2010
Friday, April 23, 2010
The TAPI Pipeline and US Policy Toward Afghanistan
In November, 2009, President Barack Obama honored eighteen fallen American soldiers at a midnight ceremony at Dover Air Force Base in Delaware. Let us home that none of these heroes died in order to pave the way for the Trans Afghanistan Pipeline. Advocates of the TAP— sometimes known as TAPI--see it has a modern-day extension of the ancient Silk Road. Congress has passed two Silk Road Strategy Acts ( 1999-2006) that essentially voice strong support for projecting US military and economic power into the Eurasian Corridor in Central Asia. Talk about moving natural gas on the TAP does not pass the lips of our politicians or pundits, but has been a big factor in our dealings with Afghanistan since the 1990s. Operation Enduring Freedom was about terrorism, but much more was involved. Noam Chomsky has reminded us that the pipeline would sharply reduce the region’s dependency upon Iran for energy. There is also the matter of competition with Russia. In September, Zamir Kabulov Russian ambassador to Afghanistan, said that the “ U.S. and its allies are competing with Russia for influence in the energy-rich region….Afghanistan remains a strategic prize because of its location.”
The Clinton and Bush administrations both sought stability in Afghanistan to permit California-based construction of a planned twin pipelines--- Caspian natural gas and oil-- to take Caspian fuels through Afghanistan into Pakistan and India. TAP only briefly involved oil as well as gas; it is now a natural gas venture. For a time, it appeared that the ide3a of bringing Caspian oil through Afghanistan had been abandoned. Now, there is again talk of an oil pipeline, but it would follow a different rout. It would not be part of a twin pipeline.
A major benefit of TAP is that it would provide Caspian fuel not controlled by Russia’s Gazprom. It would begin in the Daulatabad gas field and bring gas to Pakistan and India. The line would also outflank a proposed Iran- Pakistan-India ( IPI) line, that would probably benefit China and its China National Petroleum Corporation. India has been hedging its bets by disc using the second line with Iran and China, and there were some break-troughs in the negotiations with Iran in 2008. The United States, of course, has been actively opposing the Chinese project, in part because it would hasten economic development in Iran. The US is pressuring India to withdraw from discussions of the IPI and not to agree to buy natural gas from the IPI. Iran is pressing India for a definite commitment and is threatening to go it alone, with the help of China. Recent reverses in the Afghan War have given new life to prospects for the IPI. Though it would appear that China and the US are working at cross purposes in Afghanistan, that is not quite the case. Since 2008, China, with the help of British engineers and geologists, has begun exploiting the woprld’s largest copper deposits thirty miles south of Kabuil in the Aynak Valley. The deposits are estimated to be worth $88 billion. This project will greatly improve the economy in an area marked by continued warfare. It could serve to reduce the power of the insurgency in the long run.
An even murkier economic factor that could relate to the Afghan War is the poppy trade. Beginning in the late 1970s, the CIA encouraged the mujahedeen to finance its war against the Soviets with opium. The Taliban, under Mullah Omar, shut down the opium trade in 2000 as a way of putting pressure on the West. After the US/NATO occupation , poppy cultivation has skyrocketed and Afghanistan now supplies almost all the world’s opium. The U.S. has largely turned a blind eye to the opium trade even though troops must move through poppy fields in their search for the Taliban. There are token US/UN efforts to halt the trade, but it is clear that the Afghan government itself, as well as its security forces, thrive on opium money. There are also reports that the infusion of vast amounts of opium money into world financial markets after the collapse of 2008 greatly facilitated the restoration the woprld financial infrastgructure. What all this has to do with U.S. continued involvement in Afghanistan cannot be demonstrated.
There is no way of knowing how important the gas pipeline is as a motive for the Afghan War? All we can do is review the facts.
Bridas vs. US Oil
The 1040 mile pipeline was the idea of Carlos A. Budgheroni of Bridas, an Argentine firm. In 1995, he thought he had a secure agreement with Afghanistan and Turkmenistan to develop the project. He invited California-based Unocal to join his consortium, but the American firm soon elbowed out Bridas and launched its own consortium. In March, 1995, the governments of Turkmenistan and Pakistan signed a memorandum of agreement to co-operate on the pipeline. Unocal created the Central Asian Gas and Pipeline Consortium in August, 1996, with Unocal holding 46.5 %. The government of Turkmenistan had some involvement, and by 2000, Halliburton was in Turkmenistan to provide “integrated drilling services with an estimated value of $30 million for the total package." There were firms from Russia, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Japan, Pakistan, and South Korea.
Unocal, which was to be purchased by Chevron, soon began courting the Taliban faction and brought some of its leaders to its headquarters in Sugarland, Texas in 1997. The delegation , led by Mullah Mohammed Ghaus, visited Unocal headquarters in Sugarland, toured NASA Space Center facilities, and visited the Houston Zoo. The corporation sponsored the training of Afghans in oil technology at the University of Nebraska, but soon backed off and gave the impression it was no longer interested in the Afghan venture It seemed that the desired deal was about to be signed, but the Taliban seemed to lose interest in dealing with the U.S .
The Taliban, which had been created with the help of the US and Pakistan, was seen as a vehicle for providing stability in Afghanistan. It had a bad record on its treatment of women and on human rights, but the US and Unocal still supported it. In 1996, the Taliban gained the upper hand in the civil war when it occupied Kabul. At that time, it invited Osama bin Laden to Afghanistan as a guest.
The Taliban’s honored guest supported Bridas. His engineers had taken the trouble to sip tea with Afghan leaders, and some of the Taliban agreed with Bin Laden that the contract should go to Bridas. He also offered to let Afghanistan tap some of the gas from the line, while t6he Americans were not promising that. The French newspaper Le Figaro reported that U.S. intelligence people maintained contacts with Bin Laden in hopes that he could find a way to renew his ties with the United States. An agent met with him in July, 2001 but could not restore ties. Bin Laden remained angry that there were U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, which he considered holy soil.
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Unocal employed two influential Pashtuns-- Taliban backer Kalmay Khalizad, a Chicago Ph.D. and Hamid Karzai, leader of the Pashtun Durrani tribe who also had ties to the royal family. Khalizad was to be on the Bush National Security Council, and Karzai would preside over the regime the that US would install in Afghanistan. Patrick Martin has written, “If history had skipped over September 11 and the events of that day had never happened, it is very likely that the United States would have gone to war in Afghanistan anyway, and on much the same schedule.”
In January, 1998, the Taliban selected CentGas over the Argentine firm to build the pipelines. The Russians pulled out of the deal in June. Due to Al Qaeda’s bombing of two African embassies, the Clinton administration, in 1998, banned further negotiations with Afghanistan.
Enron and the Line
Unocal suspended activities in pursuit of the pipeline, in December, 1998, but Enron quietly began to take a leadership role. Enron was facing a financial crisis, and the pipeline would make Enron lands in the Caspian Basin very valuable. Enron had just purchased enormous tracts of land in Turkmenistan and gambled that the pipeline would make the acquisitions very profitable. Construction of the TAP would also make it possible to get cheap natural gas to the Dabhol, India power plant, which was then a huge financial liability for Enron and General Electric.
Bush Policy Toward Afghanistan
The Bush administration, in early 2001, lifted the Clinton ban, probably to give Enron one last change to negotiate a successful pipeline deal and possibly reverse its fortunes. Secretary of State Colin Powell quickly gave the Taliban $43 million for “humanitarian purposes.” It is possible that the younger Bush knew nothing about the pipeline deal. Condoleezza Rice was a former member of the Chevron board, but it should be recalled that she did not see the Phoenix memo on terrorism before 9/11. It was thought essential that relations with Saudi Arabia improve if the pipeline negotiations were to be successful.
The effort to force the Taliban to accept U.S. demands was probably related to attempts to assist Enron Corporation avoids financial shipwreck. If a coalition government emerged quickly in Afghanistan, it was believed conditions would be right for the construction of gas and oil pipelines across that country, a venture in which Enron was heavily involved. The gas [pipeline would also place Enron’s three billion power plant in Dabhol, India on a profitable basis. In an unprecedented effort to assist a private concern, the National Security Council was they coordinating a government-wide drive to force India to make payments to the Enron power plant in Dabhol. To assist Enron and other energy wholesalers make the most of the energy crisis in California, the administration resisted calls to reinstate price caps on interstate energy sales. Enron and Ken Lay were permitted to exert great influence in fashioning the Bush energy plan.
The Bush administration sharply reversed U.S. policy with respect to Afghanistan. Whether the new approach to diplomacy with the Taliban was related to the administration’s somewhat relaxed approach to counterterrorism cannot be known. Contacts with the Taliban were reopened and a vigorous carrot and stick approach was pursued in an effort to have Bin Laden turned over and set in motion a coalition government there. A coalition government, which would open the door to the proposed twin pipeline across Afghanistan. The Afghan government would benefit from fees paid for construction rights and later for sending oil and natural gas through the lines.
Laili Helms, niece by marriage to former CIA director Richard Helms and a relative of King Zahir Shah, quickly arranged for Sayed Rahmatullah Hashami, an envoy of Mullah Omar, to visit Washington. Helms, whose two grandfathers had been Afghan officials, was working as a public relations consultant for the Taliban. Hashami brought a carpet for George W. Bush, a gift from his one-eyed leader. According to the Village Voice, he offered to detain Osama bin Laden long enough for US agents to seize the terrorist, but for some reason the US did not accept the offer. Not long after that, bin Laden announced in a written statement that he and Omar has sworn baya or blood brotherhood. At this time, the Voice of America’s Pashtun service broadcasted so much favorable information about Mullah Omar and the Taliban that wags called the woman heading that division “Kandahar Rose.”
Dr. Christiana Rocca, who had been a CIA operative in Afghanistan from 1982 to 1997, began working on the Afghanistan problem for the State Department in May, 2001. At the same time, State maintained constant contact with the Taliban diplomatic mission in Queens and remained hostile to the Northern Alliance’s Islamic State of Afghanistan, which was recognized by the United Nations. As late as July, the CIA welcomed Qazi Hussein Ahmed , head of the pro-Bin Laden Jamiaat-i-Islami Party, at the George H.W. Bush Intelligence Center in Langley, Virginia. The policy was clearly to work out an gas deal with the Taliban.
Diplomacy Rarely Discussed in US Press
State Department representatives met with counterparts from Iran, Italy, Germany, and in Geneva to devise ways to force the Taliban to enter an oil/gas deal with the United States. The 6+2 negotiating process was also in motion with Francesc Vendrell, personal representative of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, making five trips to Kandahar and Kabul between April 19 and August 17, 2001. There also a stormy UN sponsored meeting in Brussels on May 15 which the Taliban foreign minister refused to attend because Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, the Northern Alliance representative was there. Twenty-one nations had representatives at Weston Park in England in July, where a coalition government under the oversight of former King Zahir Shah was tentatively agreed.
There was a March meeting of the UN-sponsored A group of 6 + 2" in Berlin. The 6+2 meetings were “level-2” discussions because they were attended by former government officials. These former officials tried to reflect the policies of their governments, but their lack of official positions gave their governments a large measure of desirability if something went wrong. Nevertheless, they were useful forums for exchanging ideas that clearly represented the positions of the governments involved. The small US delegation included Tom Simons, former ambassador to Pakistan, and Robert Oakley, a Unocal lobbyist and former ambassador. In a May meeting in Geneva, the US unveiled plans to attack Afghanistan. Representatives of Iran, Germany, and Italy were present. In July, war with Afghanistan was again discussed at the Group of 8 meeting in Genoa. An Indian observer was also present for these discussions and even contributed plans. The US was busy acquiring base rights in Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan.
Another Berlin meeting was held in July. The Taliban was expected to send a spokesman, but he did not appear, probably because the Northern Alliance was represented there. It was later reported in Europe that the US spokesman said that the Taliban could either “ accept our offer of a carpet of gold, or we bury you under a carpet of bombs.'' Simons denied that a direct threat was made in these words but conceded that the subject of force may have come up in connection with a discussion of the investigation of the attack on the USS Cole. He also said that “It is possible that an American participant, acting mischievously, after some glasses, evoked the gold carpets and the carpet bombs.” Whatever Simons’ exact words were, people came away convinced that the US was determined employ force in Afghanistan if it did not get its way.
A British newspaper later reported that it was said that the bombing could begin as early as October. Niaz Naik, Pakistan’s former foreign minister, in mid-July, reported back to his government that he was US would resort to force if Pakistan could not persuade the Taliban to come into line. Pakistan passed this information on to the Taliban. It was later reported on French television, “Islamabad and Pakistani military circles were buzzing with rumors of war.” The Indian press reported in October that "Tajikistan and Uzbekistan will lead the ground attack with a strong military back up of the U.S. and Russia. Vital Taliban installations and military assets will be targeted. “ MSNBC reported that the plan to invade Afghanistan was on Bush’s desk before 9/11 and included giving a red light to the Northern Alliance to mount a major campaign against the Taliban. On the afternoon of September 11, General Richard Myers reported at a teleconferenced NSC meeting that the Pentagon had 42 major Taliban bombing targets. After the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration immediately attributed it to Osama Bin Laden, but he repeatedly denied any involvement for several weeks. Later, a videotape turned up in Afghanistan in which Bin Laden supposedly took credit for the attack; however, some translators deny that is what he said.
Dr. Christina Rocca, represented the US at its last meeting with the Taliban, which occurred five weeks (August 2) before September 11 in Islamabad. The Taliban, at this point, was in the process of awarding the twin pipeline deal to an Argentine-led consortium. At that meeting she demanded that the Taliban turn over bin Laden. In an interview, Brisard commented on the Islamabad meeting:
We believe that when [Rocca] went to Pakistan in [August] 2001 she was there to speak about oil, and unfortunately the Osama bin Laden case was just a technical part of the negotiations. He said “ I'm not sure about the pipeline specifically, but we make it clear she was there to speak about oil. There are witnesses, including the Pakistani foreign minister.”
Journalists outside the United States have discussed these events in detail and raise the possibility that the threat of military action may have had a direct effect on the timing of Al Qaeda’s attack on America. The last US-Taliban meeting occurred five days before 9/11. The Taliban continued to grant hospitality to Osama bin Laden and refused to turn him over until the US promised him a fair trial and submitted the proper extradition papers. Those papers were not submitted.
After the successful US attack on Afghanistan, the US installed a government led by a former employee of Unocal/Chevron, Hamid Karzai. His regime, on February 8, 2002, agreed with Pakistan to enter into a long-term agreement with a US-led consortium to build a twin pipeline that would bring gas and oil from the Caspian Basin down through Afghanistan and to the coast of Pakistan and to India. Kevin Phillips, a Republican writer, was to note that US troops in Afghanistan were to become “pipeline protection troops.” The value of Caspian oil and gas has been placed at $4 trillion. However, little progressed has been made on the pipeline, and Unocal, since 1998, has claimed that it is no longer involved in the consortium.
Recent Developments
In December, 2002, the leaders of Turkmenistan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan signed a new agreement to move ahead with the pipelines. Six years later, the governments of India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan agreed to purchase gas coming through the pipeline. The Asian Development Bank will finance the $7.6 billion venture. In 2006, the United States assured India that the project would go ahead. In 2008, Afghanistan assured India that landmines would be cleared, making construction possible. Technical experts met in Ashgabat to deal with transit agreements and other details. It appears that the project will be financed through the Asia Development Bank, whose largest share holders are the U.S. and Japan. . The Indian Gas authority has suggested that Russia’s Gazprom be brought in as a consultant and maybe even the eventually operator of the line. However, the project cannot move forward because southern Afghanistan is controlled by the Taliban. If the TAP is ever built, the Afghan government will receive 8% of the revenue. It may well be that the Afghans, in their failure to resolve their problems, have frittered away the prospect of this windfall There is growing doubt in the region that stability will be restored in Afghanistan, and there is now talk of using the proposed IPI line that would not involve Afghanistan. Two problems are that using this line would benefit Iran and China, not the U.S.
The Clinton and Bush administrations both sought stability in Afghanistan to permit California-based construction of a planned twin pipelines--- Caspian natural gas and oil-- to take Caspian fuels through Afghanistan into Pakistan and India. TAP only briefly involved oil as well as gas; it is now a natural gas venture. For a time, it appeared that the ide3a of bringing Caspian oil through Afghanistan had been abandoned. Now, there is again talk of an oil pipeline, but it would follow a different rout. It would not be part of a twin pipeline.
A major benefit of TAP is that it would provide Caspian fuel not controlled by Russia’s Gazprom. It would begin in the Daulatabad gas field and bring gas to Pakistan and India. The line would also outflank a proposed Iran- Pakistan-India ( IPI) line, that would probably benefit China and its China National Petroleum Corporation. India has been hedging its bets by disc using the second line with Iran and China, and there were some break-troughs in the negotiations with Iran in 2008. The United States, of course, has been actively opposing the Chinese project, in part because it would hasten economic development in Iran. The US is pressuring India to withdraw from discussions of the IPI and not to agree to buy natural gas from the IPI. Iran is pressing India for a definite commitment and is threatening to go it alone, with the help of China. Recent reverses in the Afghan War have given new life to prospects for the IPI. Though it would appear that China and the US are working at cross purposes in Afghanistan, that is not quite the case. Since 2008, China, with the help of British engineers and geologists, has begun exploiting the woprld’s largest copper deposits thirty miles south of Kabuil in the Aynak Valley. The deposits are estimated to be worth $88 billion. This project will greatly improve the economy in an area marked by continued warfare. It could serve to reduce the power of the insurgency in the long run.
An even murkier economic factor that could relate to the Afghan War is the poppy trade. Beginning in the late 1970s, the CIA encouraged the mujahedeen to finance its war against the Soviets with opium. The Taliban, under Mullah Omar, shut down the opium trade in 2000 as a way of putting pressure on the West. After the US/NATO occupation , poppy cultivation has skyrocketed and Afghanistan now supplies almost all the world’s opium. The U.S. has largely turned a blind eye to the opium trade even though troops must move through poppy fields in their search for the Taliban. There are token US/UN efforts to halt the trade, but it is clear that the Afghan government itself, as well as its security forces, thrive on opium money. There are also reports that the infusion of vast amounts of opium money into world financial markets after the collapse of 2008 greatly facilitated the restoration the woprld financial infrastgructure. What all this has to do with U.S. continued involvement in Afghanistan cannot be demonstrated.
There is no way of knowing how important the gas pipeline is as a motive for the Afghan War? All we can do is review the facts.
Bridas vs. US Oil
The 1040 mile pipeline was the idea of Carlos A. Budgheroni of Bridas, an Argentine firm. In 1995, he thought he had a secure agreement with Afghanistan and Turkmenistan to develop the project. He invited California-based Unocal to join his consortium, but the American firm soon elbowed out Bridas and launched its own consortium. In March, 1995, the governments of Turkmenistan and Pakistan signed a memorandum of agreement to co-operate on the pipeline. Unocal created the Central Asian Gas and Pipeline Consortium in August, 1996, with Unocal holding 46.5 %. The government of Turkmenistan had some involvement, and by 2000, Halliburton was in Turkmenistan to provide “integrated drilling services with an estimated value of $30 million for the total package." There were firms from Russia, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Japan, Pakistan, and South Korea.
Unocal, which was to be purchased by Chevron, soon began courting the Taliban faction and brought some of its leaders to its headquarters in Sugarland, Texas in 1997. The delegation , led by Mullah Mohammed Ghaus, visited Unocal headquarters in Sugarland, toured NASA Space Center facilities, and visited the Houston Zoo. The corporation sponsored the training of Afghans in oil technology at the University of Nebraska, but soon backed off and gave the impression it was no longer interested in the Afghan venture It seemed that the desired deal was about to be signed, but the Taliban seemed to lose interest in dealing with the U.S .
The Taliban, which had been created with the help of the US and Pakistan, was seen as a vehicle for providing stability in Afghanistan. It had a bad record on its treatment of women and on human rights, but the US and Unocal still supported it. In 1996, the Taliban gained the upper hand in the civil war when it occupied Kabul. At that time, it invited Osama bin Laden to Afghanistan as a guest.
The Taliban’s honored guest supported Bridas. His engineers had taken the trouble to sip tea with Afghan leaders, and some of the Taliban agreed with Bin Laden that the contract should go to Bridas. He also offered to let Afghanistan tap some of the gas from the line, while t6he Americans were not promising that. The French newspaper Le Figaro reported that U.S. intelligence people maintained contacts with Bin Laden in hopes that he could find a way to renew his ties with the United States. An agent met with him in July, 2001 but could not restore ties. Bin Laden remained angry that there were U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, which he considered holy soil.
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Unocal employed two influential Pashtuns-- Taliban backer Kalmay Khalizad, a Chicago Ph.D. and Hamid Karzai, leader of the Pashtun Durrani tribe who also had ties to the royal family. Khalizad was to be on the Bush National Security Council, and Karzai would preside over the regime the that US would install in Afghanistan. Patrick Martin has written, “If history had skipped over September 11 and the events of that day had never happened, it is very likely that the United States would have gone to war in Afghanistan anyway, and on much the same schedule.”
In January, 1998, the Taliban selected CentGas over the Argentine firm to build the pipelines. The Russians pulled out of the deal in June. Due to Al Qaeda’s bombing of two African embassies, the Clinton administration, in 1998, banned further negotiations with Afghanistan.
Enron and the Line
Unocal suspended activities in pursuit of the pipeline, in December, 1998, but Enron quietly began to take a leadership role. Enron was facing a financial crisis, and the pipeline would make Enron lands in the Caspian Basin very valuable. Enron had just purchased enormous tracts of land in Turkmenistan and gambled that the pipeline would make the acquisitions very profitable. Construction of the TAP would also make it possible to get cheap natural gas to the Dabhol, India power plant, which was then a huge financial liability for Enron and General Electric.
Bush Policy Toward Afghanistan
The Bush administration, in early 2001, lifted the Clinton ban, probably to give Enron one last change to negotiate a successful pipeline deal and possibly reverse its fortunes. Secretary of State Colin Powell quickly gave the Taliban $43 million for “humanitarian purposes.” It is possible that the younger Bush knew nothing about the pipeline deal. Condoleezza Rice was a former member of the Chevron board, but it should be recalled that she did not see the Phoenix memo on terrorism before 9/11. It was thought essential that relations with Saudi Arabia improve if the pipeline negotiations were to be successful.
The effort to force the Taliban to accept U.S. demands was probably related to attempts to assist Enron Corporation avoids financial shipwreck. If a coalition government emerged quickly in Afghanistan, it was believed conditions would be right for the construction of gas and oil pipelines across that country, a venture in which Enron was heavily involved. The gas [pipeline would also place Enron’s three billion power plant in Dabhol, India on a profitable basis. In an unprecedented effort to assist a private concern, the National Security Council was they coordinating a government-wide drive to force India to make payments to the Enron power plant in Dabhol. To assist Enron and other energy wholesalers make the most of the energy crisis in California, the administration resisted calls to reinstate price caps on interstate energy sales. Enron and Ken Lay were permitted to exert great influence in fashioning the Bush energy plan.
The Bush administration sharply reversed U.S. policy with respect to Afghanistan. Whether the new approach to diplomacy with the Taliban was related to the administration’s somewhat relaxed approach to counterterrorism cannot be known. Contacts with the Taliban were reopened and a vigorous carrot and stick approach was pursued in an effort to have Bin Laden turned over and set in motion a coalition government there. A coalition government, which would open the door to the proposed twin pipeline across Afghanistan. The Afghan government would benefit from fees paid for construction rights and later for sending oil and natural gas through the lines.
Laili Helms, niece by marriage to former CIA director Richard Helms and a relative of King Zahir Shah, quickly arranged for Sayed Rahmatullah Hashami, an envoy of Mullah Omar, to visit Washington. Helms, whose two grandfathers had been Afghan officials, was working as a public relations consultant for the Taliban. Hashami brought a carpet for George W. Bush, a gift from his one-eyed leader. According to the Village Voice, he offered to detain Osama bin Laden long enough for US agents to seize the terrorist, but for some reason the US did not accept the offer. Not long after that, bin Laden announced in a written statement that he and Omar has sworn baya or blood brotherhood. At this time, the Voice of America’s Pashtun service broadcasted so much favorable information about Mullah Omar and the Taliban that wags called the woman heading that division “Kandahar Rose.”
Dr. Christiana Rocca, who had been a CIA operative in Afghanistan from 1982 to 1997, began working on the Afghanistan problem for the State Department in May, 2001. At the same time, State maintained constant contact with the Taliban diplomatic mission in Queens and remained hostile to the Northern Alliance’s Islamic State of Afghanistan, which was recognized by the United Nations. As late as July, the CIA welcomed Qazi Hussein Ahmed , head of the pro-Bin Laden Jamiaat-i-Islami Party, at the George H.W. Bush Intelligence Center in Langley, Virginia. The policy was clearly to work out an gas deal with the Taliban.
Diplomacy Rarely Discussed in US Press
State Department representatives met with counterparts from Iran, Italy, Germany, and in Geneva to devise ways to force the Taliban to enter an oil/gas deal with the United States. The 6+2 negotiating process was also in motion with Francesc Vendrell, personal representative of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, making five trips to Kandahar and Kabul between April 19 and August 17, 2001. There also a stormy UN sponsored meeting in Brussels on May 15 which the Taliban foreign minister refused to attend because Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, the Northern Alliance representative was there. Twenty-one nations had representatives at Weston Park in England in July, where a coalition government under the oversight of former King Zahir Shah was tentatively agreed.
There was a March meeting of the UN-sponsored A group of 6 + 2" in Berlin. The 6+2 meetings were “level-2” discussions because they were attended by former government officials. These former officials tried to reflect the policies of their governments, but their lack of official positions gave their governments a large measure of desirability if something went wrong. Nevertheless, they were useful forums for exchanging ideas that clearly represented the positions of the governments involved. The small US delegation included Tom Simons, former ambassador to Pakistan, and Robert Oakley, a Unocal lobbyist and former ambassador. In a May meeting in Geneva, the US unveiled plans to attack Afghanistan. Representatives of Iran, Germany, and Italy were present. In July, war with Afghanistan was again discussed at the Group of 8 meeting in Genoa. An Indian observer was also present for these discussions and even contributed plans. The US was busy acquiring base rights in Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan.
Another Berlin meeting was held in July. The Taliban was expected to send a spokesman, but he did not appear, probably because the Northern Alliance was represented there. It was later reported in Europe that the US spokesman said that the Taliban could either “ accept our offer of a carpet of gold, or we bury you under a carpet of bombs.'' Simons denied that a direct threat was made in these words but conceded that the subject of force may have come up in connection with a discussion of the investigation of the attack on the USS Cole. He also said that “It is possible that an American participant, acting mischievously, after some glasses, evoked the gold carpets and the carpet bombs.” Whatever Simons’ exact words were, people came away convinced that the US was determined employ force in Afghanistan if it did not get its way.
A British newspaper later reported that it was said that the bombing could begin as early as October. Niaz Naik, Pakistan’s former foreign minister, in mid-July, reported back to his government that he was US would resort to force if Pakistan could not persuade the Taliban to come into line. Pakistan passed this information on to the Taliban. It was later reported on French television, “Islamabad and Pakistani military circles were buzzing with rumors of war.” The Indian press reported in October that "Tajikistan and Uzbekistan will lead the ground attack with a strong military back up of the U.S. and Russia. Vital Taliban installations and military assets will be targeted. “ MSNBC reported that the plan to invade Afghanistan was on Bush’s desk before 9/11 and included giving a red light to the Northern Alliance to mount a major campaign against the Taliban. On the afternoon of September 11, General Richard Myers reported at a teleconferenced NSC meeting that the Pentagon had 42 major Taliban bombing targets. After the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration immediately attributed it to Osama Bin Laden, but he repeatedly denied any involvement for several weeks. Later, a videotape turned up in Afghanistan in which Bin Laden supposedly took credit for the attack; however, some translators deny that is what he said.
Dr. Christina Rocca, represented the US at its last meeting with the Taliban, which occurred five weeks (August 2) before September 11 in Islamabad. The Taliban, at this point, was in the process of awarding the twin pipeline deal to an Argentine-led consortium. At that meeting she demanded that the Taliban turn over bin Laden. In an interview, Brisard commented on the Islamabad meeting:
We believe that when [Rocca] went to Pakistan in [August] 2001 she was there to speak about oil, and unfortunately the Osama bin Laden case was just a technical part of the negotiations. He said “ I'm not sure about the pipeline specifically, but we make it clear she was there to speak about oil. There are witnesses, including the Pakistani foreign minister.”
Journalists outside the United States have discussed these events in detail and raise the possibility that the threat of military action may have had a direct effect on the timing of Al Qaeda’s attack on America. The last US-Taliban meeting occurred five days before 9/11. The Taliban continued to grant hospitality to Osama bin Laden and refused to turn him over until the US promised him a fair trial and submitted the proper extradition papers. Those papers were not submitted.
After the successful US attack on Afghanistan, the US installed a government led by a former employee of Unocal/Chevron, Hamid Karzai. His regime, on February 8, 2002, agreed with Pakistan to enter into a long-term agreement with a US-led consortium to build a twin pipeline that would bring gas and oil from the Caspian Basin down through Afghanistan and to the coast of Pakistan and to India. Kevin Phillips, a Republican writer, was to note that US troops in Afghanistan were to become “pipeline protection troops.” The value of Caspian oil and gas has been placed at $4 trillion. However, little progressed has been made on the pipeline, and Unocal, since 1998, has claimed that it is no longer involved in the consortium.
Recent Developments
In December, 2002, the leaders of Turkmenistan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan signed a new agreement to move ahead with the pipelines. Six years later, the governments of India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan agreed to purchase gas coming through the pipeline. The Asian Development Bank will finance the $7.6 billion venture. In 2006, the United States assured India that the project would go ahead. In 2008, Afghanistan assured India that landmines would be cleared, making construction possible. Technical experts met in Ashgabat to deal with transit agreements and other details. It appears that the project will be financed through the Asia Development Bank, whose largest share holders are the U.S. and Japan. . The Indian Gas authority has suggested that Russia’s Gazprom be brought in as a consultant and maybe even the eventually operator of the line. However, the project cannot move forward because southern Afghanistan is controlled by the Taliban. If the TAP is ever built, the Afghan government will receive 8% of the revenue. It may well be that the Afghans, in their failure to resolve their problems, have frittered away the prospect of this windfall There is growing doubt in the region that stability will be restored in Afghanistan, and there is now talk of using the proposed IPI line that would not involve Afghanistan. Two problems are that using this line would benefit Iran and China, not the U.S.
Sunday, October 11, 2009
An Afghan Quagmire in the Making : Considering the Options
We are mourning the loss of eight American soldiers who died in a day-long battle near the Pakistan border. They were killed by a well armed force that dwarfed them in size. Their mission was to try to stem the flow of Pakistani Taliban fighters over the border to join their allies in the Afghan Taliban. Indeed, a number of the fighters were Pakistani Taliban expelled from the Swat Valley by Pakistan’s army.
The guerilla force that confronted the Americans numbered about 300. In Iraq, the guerilla forces seldom exceeded 30, with the possible exception of the fighting in Falluhah.
Now we are facing the decision of whether to send in many more troops to continue a policy of nation-building and providing population security. The situation in Afghanistan is enormously complex, and there clearly is no easy resolution or way out.
Lieutenant General Stanley McCrystal has warned Washington that we are losing in our battle against the Taliban and other insurgents in Afghanistan. He has called for an additional 10,000 to 40,000 troops, and he has the backing of his very popular boss, General David Petraeus. There is a parallel to the “clear and hold” strategy employed in Vietnam, but McCrystal would be more careful with firepower and more interested in economic development.
During the campaign, Barack Obama sought to show that he was strong on national security by saying that Afghanistan was the necessary war. Now those remarks are haunting him as he ponders the sad history of foreign involvements in Afghanistan and our unpromising situation there now. Much of latter was due to the policies of the Bush Administration, but voters have short memories, and Obama will pay for lack of success in Afghanistan. Not long ago, Obama once referred the Afghanistan effort as “a necessary war,” but he has not repeated that term. Necessary wars involve out nation’s vital interests. No vital interests are involved in Afghanistan, so this is a “war of choice.”
The fact is that preoccupation with Iraq and Afghanistan represent massive distortions of American foreign policy. Our main concerns are elsewhere. Obama needs to help our people regain a sense of perspective.
For the moment, Obama is taking time to reconsider our objectives in Afghanistan. Afghanistan has become a NATO mission, and our president would be well advised to invite NATO to join in these deliberations. Otherwise, it will appear that we are continuing the Bush policy of dictating to others. Obama was selected for the Nobel Prize in part because he turned away from unilateralism and opted for engaging our allies and others. France, Germany, and Great Britain have asked for an international conference to discuss how NATO forces can be phased out in Afghanistan. In view of the growing sentiment in Europe against the Afghanistan operation, it would be wise to learn how much support we could count on if we ramp up the effort to provide population security. Already some writers fear that extended involvement in Afghanistan could be the rock on which the NATO vessel breaks. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has endorsed Obama’s decision to review the policy and has said that it is more important to get the right strategy than to rely on putting in more troops.
Biden’s Approach
Vice President Joseph Biden, after much study and two unpleasant meetings with Hamid Karzai, has concluded that the current regime in Afghanistan will not be a reliable partner for an effort to establish security for the population in Afghanistan. Until recently, National Security Advisor James L. Jones appeared to agree. Biden’s view is that the US needs to focus less on Afghanistan and more on Pakistan, where Al Qaeda is and where instability makes that nation’s nuclear weapons a potential problem.
Biden suggests ramping down the counter-insurgency effort and focusing on damaging Al Qaeda, partly through Predators and air power. Spies and Special Forces and other black ops would also be involved. The US will be able to continue its drone air strikes in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, but it is doubtful that Pakistan can permit the US to bomb Taliban sites in Quetta, capital of Baluchistan province. We can be of greter help to the Pakistanis as they are finally going against their own Taliban. At the moment, they are preparing an offensive in Waziristan.
Of course, the US will need enough stability in some parts of Afghanistan so they can be used as bases to launch all manner of assaults against Al Qaeda. In the long run, it is doubtful that we can put Al Qaeda out of business, but we should make it out top priority inflicting as much damage as possible.
There are signs that some of the insurgents are amenable to negotiations, and it is possible that money and diplomacy could accomplish with them what more troops may not. There are now pilot efforts to negotiate with and build up the forces of some warlords. In some ways this more parallels what the surge was all about in Iraq than manipulating the number of troops on the ground.
Of course, the Biden plan would not stop the training and recruitment of Afghan soldiers and police. It should include giving the army better equipment. Much more attention must be given to rapidly enlarging and retraining the Afghan military. At this point, it has a 24% defection rate. Soldiers even take weapons home and sometimes continue to receive pay. Much needs to be done building a centralized police force. The fact that Taliban fighters could get attack the Indian Embassy in Kabul underscores the dimensions of this problem.
In the last analysis, preventing a Taliban victory in Afghanistan is out of our hands. It depends upon what the people think of the Karzai regime and the extent to which the Afghan police and army can be effective.
Should the Al Qaeda reenter Afghanistan, we would have no choice but to resume round-the-clock carpet bombing of areas where they establish bases. Taliban leaders remember the bombing and realize that it would be repeated should they assist Al Qaeda establish camps and bases in their country.
Republicans Demand Escalation of the Afghanistan War
With the remarkable exception of George Will, Republicans back the former Special Forces commander. They stand to gain no matter what Obama does in Afghanistan. If more troops are sent, and there is still failure of stalemate, they still win big time. Few will remember that John McCain and others beat the drums for more troops and a long war.
A common argument is that any backing away from an all-out effort will give Al Qaeda new energy and attract more recruits to their standard. In truth, American policy in Iraq and our tactics in Afghanistan, which harmed many civilians, were responsible for recruiting people for the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Sami Yousafzai’s interviews of Taliban people in the current Newsweek demonstrates how Bush Administration tactics alienated many and strengthened the Taliban. It is unlikely that the salutary change in course under General McCrystal can reverse the damage. Moreover, his turn toward the exercise of soft power -- economic and social development-- is all to the good, but this policy will require more time than we have. It can be recalled that it took John Paul Vann many years to work economic and social miracles in the Mekong Delta.
We frequently hear that anything less than a ramped up war in Afghanistan will damage U.S. credibility abroad. There may be some truth to this. Certainly other nations will not doubt that we have the ability to go anywhere and bring about massive destruction when we do not get our way. The real question should be “Does our national interest require expenditure of a great deal of blood and treasure in Afghanistan? “
A similarly weak argument is that we must prevent Afghanistan from becoming a failed state so that Al Qaeda will not use it as a base of operations. This wrongly assumes that there are no other failed states Al Qaeda can use as a base. Moreover, the terrorist organization appears to be unhampered in its operations in Pakistan. As General Jones has admitted, there is no reason why the Taliban would want to leave. He claims there are less than 100 Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.
Republicans could argue that the long term morale of our armed forces could be adversely effected if we did not escalate and then “win” in Afghanistan. The Vietnam War was devastating, and it took a long time for our military to restore its spirits. Right now, the military seems to be thinking in terms of “winning” and “loosing.” Its leadership should be educating our forces to think in terms of accomplishing limited goals.
Republican columnist Michael Gerson eschews the most simplistic arguments and admits the complexity of the situation in Afghanistan. Still, he senses that Obama is in a no-win situation. Gerson redefines the civilian-military relationship a bit by insisting that suggesting that tradition demands that Obama select his best general and get out of the way. He even mentions Harry S. Truman in this respect, though the use of that precedent can be debated. In the end, Abraham Lincoln accepted U.S. Grant’s meatgrinder approach, but he had been involved in many military decisions throughout the war. Another way to look at this is to recall that Lincoln bucked the popular George Mc Clellan and that Truman sacked th4e very popular Douglas Mc Arthur.
One can only wonder if any of the critics are concerned that the US be in a position to construct the long-desired twin pipelines down through Afghanistan to carry Caspian gas and oil to Pakistan and , by ship , to India. This was the object of a great deal of diplomacy before 9/11, and the Bush administration even resorted to the threat of bombings. The pipelines are in our national interest but it is doubtful if soldiers should lose their lives to get them.
Another Surge?
Those who insist that Obama bow to Petraeus and McCrystal is that they think that copying the surge strategy in Afghanistan will work. The surge worked best in the urban areas of Iraq, and there are few urban areas in Afghanistan. The surge also worked in Iraq because the United States literally bought off its enemies, paying large amounts to tribal leaders and monthly stipends to their armed retainers. Only Bob Woodward has openly discussed another reason why the surge worked. Special Forces in Iraq, under McCrystal, carried out something like the Vietnam War’s Operation Phoenix and eliminated thousands of the insurgent cadre.
Repeating some version of Phoenix in Afghanistan does not require a huge increase in American forces there. Over seven years, we have spent $38 billion in Afghanistan, with few discernable positive results. Perhaps more of the money sent there should be used to buy off warlords and put their troops on retainer. Its worth a try.
Should We Bet on Karzai?
We still come down to whether a large new commitment in human lives, money, and American prestige should be made in Afghanistan. Many Afghans believe that the present regime is hopelessly corrupt. The recent rigged election of August 20 is one indication of how weak the Karzai regime is. The UN found that one third of the votes cast for Karzai were fraudulent. The resultant acrimony has been so great that it is unrealistic to believe that Afghans can be unified around Karzai—no matter how many troops we send there. Karzai has not bothered to denounce those who rigged the election on his behalf. His reliance upon war lords and human rights abusers is not likely to win new grassroots supporters. Of course, policy makers recall that in Vietnam the elimination of the corrupt Ngo Dinh Diem resulted in even worse leaders.
The idea that we can, using soft power, somehow win over large numbers of Karzai opponents to support him is fanciful. The counter insurgency strategy has been based upon the idea that we could eventually build a large and effective Afghan army and matching police force. The Afghan army stands at 94,000 and has had a little success in the north. It will take two years to increase it to 134,000. That is still far short of the 300 or 400 thousand that are needed. Who can remember that there were 91,000 when George W. Bush began to rebuild the army. A rational person would look at these figures and conclude that Bush either the Republican administration had done poorly or it was unrealistic to expect rapid growth of that force. Our problems began when the Bushies somehow bungled the effort to nab Osama and then pulled out our most effective people so they could begin their adventure in Iraq. Any way you look at US policy there under Bush, it is impossible to conclude that anything was accomplished. Obama inherited a ticking time bomb but don’t look to any Republican politician or publicist to mention this. The truth is that it could be too late to do much there.
There is also the lesson of Vietnam, where we did build a large, well-equipped ARVIN force that was ineffective and heavily infiltrated by the enemy. There were also many “potted plants,” units that existed on paper but not in reality.
Unless Karzai abandons brutality and corrupt practices overnight and becomes a Boy Scout, the prospects of bringing much stability to Afghanistan are slim. The man is a Pashtun and that should have helped him with the nation’s largest ethnic group. Instead, the Taliban, also largely Pashtun, have been able to play on Pashtun nationalism to enlist support.
Effectively ending with Taliban jihadism may be beyond our ability. The Afghan Taliban practices jihad but only locally. They are only a threat to the United States unless they could again provide Al Qaeda with a base of operations. However, there is no reason for Al Qaeda to leave the Waziristan area of Pakistan, where they have the run of things and even have located families there. Though the Taliban previously sheltered Al Qaeda, many Taliban are not warm friends of the Arab-led terrorists, and it is possible that clever intelligence people could drive a wedge between them. It should also be remembered that many who call themselves Taliban in Afghanistan are simply insurgents capitalizing on that name. Many of them can be bought off.
The Pakis Will Play a Double Game
Pakistan will continue playing a double game—doing enough to get aid while keeping the Afghan Taliban alive. The best we can do is induce them to do more for us. Our primary goal there is to foster enough stability in Pakistan to keep the jihadists from getting their hands on the nation’s nuclear assets. That is no small job.
The Pakistani Army, though secular, long ago resorted to sponsoring Islamic jihadism as a means of countering Indian power. They built jihadist movements to threaten India in destabilizing Kashmir. In time, a jihadist opposition emerged in Pakistan itself, and the army officer corps now must deal with the fact that religious fanaticism has infected more than a few junior officers. Because Pakistan needs to have a strong influence in Afghanistan, Pakistani intelligence, the ISI, with the help of the United States, in the late 1970s and eighties, nurtured jihadism in Afghanistan. Many in Pakistan’s ISI—once closely tied to the CIA-- are not inclined to do anything to injure the Afghanistan Taliban, and they believe that United States will not be in Afghanistan indefinitely.
The only vital interest we have in the region is preventing the destabilization of Pakistan.
In part, that is because they have nuclear weapons. We would not want those weapons or that technology to fall into the hands of terrorists. There is little we can do directly to improve the situation in Pakistan. Until a month ago, we were spending 33 times as much in Afghanistan as in Pakistan. We have recently tripled what we spend in Pakistan, but more must be done. How we do it is ticklish. The Pakistan military loudly objected to the wording of our recent aid bill because it set performance standards for receiving installments of aid. Recently, five Taliban fighters entered the military headquarters in Rawalpindi, killed some soldiers, and held 22 people as hostages. Until recently, the Taliban controlled the Swat Valley, an important district.
Unless Pakistan can be induced to stop its help of the Afghan Taliban, a US counter insurgency program will require far more troops that McCrystal is now requesting. Afghans in the south and east already see the US as an occupying power, and the presence of more troops is certain to deepen that impression in those places and possibly spread it to the rest of the country. The Mc Crystal strategy would be an occupation, and foreign occupations of that country since the time of Alexander the Great have been failures. Simply put, occupations breed angr, and long occupations breed still more anger and violence.
In retrospect, it appears that most of the billions poured into Afghanistan were a poor investment. One leading member of Karzai’s coalition said he will withdraw if more American troops are committed. This man is an American ally but thinks that more troops would mobilize more people against the government.
Too much was filtered through foreign contractors. The money would have been better spent buying off the Pakistan generals and ISI and bringing greater political stability to Pakistan. Fortunately, Congress has just tripled its appropriation for Pakistan; but the amount is still relatively small.
-------------------------
The Obama Administration wisely ended its war against the farmers growing poppies. It might be worthwhile to buy and destroy the Afghan opium crop. Using last year’s data, that might cost as much as $3.4 billion. This would not stop the Taliban from collecting taxes on it, but destruction of the whole crop would prevent the Taliban from moving large quantities of opium to the international market. That would cut their income by a third.
The situation in Afghanistan is very complex and unpromising. There are variables that the American public does not perceive. Do they know that many Afghans speak Persian and that they are strongly influenced by Iran? The latter could make things even worse for us but it has no reason now to want an unstable Afghanistan. Our dealings with Iran can impact upon what goes on in Afghanistan. By appearing to be more reasonable than Bush, President Obama has obtained some important concessions from Iran and may be able to do more. If Israel were to move against Iran, we could expect Iran to use its influence against us among its Afghan clients.
Richard Holbrooke has given us an idea of how bad the situation in Afghanistan is: “Its worse than the Nam!” It is very important that the American people understand what is involved here because a decision to make a long term commitment to pacification and nation-building will require years of commitment, massive amounts of money, and far more troops than we are now contemplating. Even with all that, there will be no guarantee that we can succeed in building a stable nation there. That is why House Minority Leader John Boehner is so angry that President Obama wants to take time making this decision. John Mc Cain has been busy claiming there is no difference between the Taliban and Al Qaeda in an effort to stampede Obama into waging a full scale war. If thoughtful independents come to understand much of what is involved, they might support Obama in redefining the mission there. Information is, as usual, the enemy of Republican policy here. The more people understand, the less damage Afghanistan will inflict on Obama’s political future.
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Sherm spent seven years writing an analytical chronicle of what the Republicans have been up to since the 1970s. It discusses elements in the Republican coalition, their ideologies, strategies, informational and financial resources, and election shenanigans. Abuses of power by the Reagan and G. W. Bush administration and the Republican Congresses are detailed. The New Republican Coalition : Its Rise and Impact, The Seventies to Present (Publish America) can be acquired by calling 301-695-1707. On line, go to http://www.publishamerica.com/shopping. It can also be obtained through the on-line operations of Amazon and Barnes and Noble. Do not consider purchasing it if you are looking for something that mirrors the mainstream media!
The guerilla force that confronted the Americans numbered about 300. In Iraq, the guerilla forces seldom exceeded 30, with the possible exception of the fighting in Falluhah.
Now we are facing the decision of whether to send in many more troops to continue a policy of nation-building and providing population security. The situation in Afghanistan is enormously complex, and there clearly is no easy resolution or way out.
Lieutenant General Stanley McCrystal has warned Washington that we are losing in our battle against the Taliban and other insurgents in Afghanistan. He has called for an additional 10,000 to 40,000 troops, and he has the backing of his very popular boss, General David Petraeus. There is a parallel to the “clear and hold” strategy employed in Vietnam, but McCrystal would be more careful with firepower and more interested in economic development.
During the campaign, Barack Obama sought to show that he was strong on national security by saying that Afghanistan was the necessary war. Now those remarks are haunting him as he ponders the sad history of foreign involvements in Afghanistan and our unpromising situation there now. Much of latter was due to the policies of the Bush Administration, but voters have short memories, and Obama will pay for lack of success in Afghanistan. Not long ago, Obama once referred the Afghanistan effort as “a necessary war,” but he has not repeated that term. Necessary wars involve out nation’s vital interests. No vital interests are involved in Afghanistan, so this is a “war of choice.”
The fact is that preoccupation with Iraq and Afghanistan represent massive distortions of American foreign policy. Our main concerns are elsewhere. Obama needs to help our people regain a sense of perspective.
For the moment, Obama is taking time to reconsider our objectives in Afghanistan. Afghanistan has become a NATO mission, and our president would be well advised to invite NATO to join in these deliberations. Otherwise, it will appear that we are continuing the Bush policy of dictating to others. Obama was selected for the Nobel Prize in part because he turned away from unilateralism and opted for engaging our allies and others. France, Germany, and Great Britain have asked for an international conference to discuss how NATO forces can be phased out in Afghanistan. In view of the growing sentiment in Europe against the Afghanistan operation, it would be wise to learn how much support we could count on if we ramp up the effort to provide population security. Already some writers fear that extended involvement in Afghanistan could be the rock on which the NATO vessel breaks. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has endorsed Obama’s decision to review the policy and has said that it is more important to get the right strategy than to rely on putting in more troops.
Biden’s Approach
Vice President Joseph Biden, after much study and two unpleasant meetings with Hamid Karzai, has concluded that the current regime in Afghanistan will not be a reliable partner for an effort to establish security for the population in Afghanistan. Until recently, National Security Advisor James L. Jones appeared to agree. Biden’s view is that the US needs to focus less on Afghanistan and more on Pakistan, where Al Qaeda is and where instability makes that nation’s nuclear weapons a potential problem.
Biden suggests ramping down the counter-insurgency effort and focusing on damaging Al Qaeda, partly through Predators and air power. Spies and Special Forces and other black ops would also be involved. The US will be able to continue its drone air strikes in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, but it is doubtful that Pakistan can permit the US to bomb Taliban sites in Quetta, capital of Baluchistan province. We can be of greter help to the Pakistanis as they are finally going against their own Taliban. At the moment, they are preparing an offensive in Waziristan.
Of course, the US will need enough stability in some parts of Afghanistan so they can be used as bases to launch all manner of assaults against Al Qaeda. In the long run, it is doubtful that we can put Al Qaeda out of business, but we should make it out top priority inflicting as much damage as possible.
There are signs that some of the insurgents are amenable to negotiations, and it is possible that money and diplomacy could accomplish with them what more troops may not. There are now pilot efforts to negotiate with and build up the forces of some warlords. In some ways this more parallels what the surge was all about in Iraq than manipulating the number of troops on the ground.
Of course, the Biden plan would not stop the training and recruitment of Afghan soldiers and police. It should include giving the army better equipment. Much more attention must be given to rapidly enlarging and retraining the Afghan military. At this point, it has a 24% defection rate. Soldiers even take weapons home and sometimes continue to receive pay. Much needs to be done building a centralized police force. The fact that Taliban fighters could get attack the Indian Embassy in Kabul underscores the dimensions of this problem.
In the last analysis, preventing a Taliban victory in Afghanistan is out of our hands. It depends upon what the people think of the Karzai regime and the extent to which the Afghan police and army can be effective.
Should the Al Qaeda reenter Afghanistan, we would have no choice but to resume round-the-clock carpet bombing of areas where they establish bases. Taliban leaders remember the bombing and realize that it would be repeated should they assist Al Qaeda establish camps and bases in their country.
Republicans Demand Escalation of the Afghanistan War
With the remarkable exception of George Will, Republicans back the former Special Forces commander. They stand to gain no matter what Obama does in Afghanistan. If more troops are sent, and there is still failure of stalemate, they still win big time. Few will remember that John McCain and others beat the drums for more troops and a long war.
A common argument is that any backing away from an all-out effort will give Al Qaeda new energy and attract more recruits to their standard. In truth, American policy in Iraq and our tactics in Afghanistan, which harmed many civilians, were responsible for recruiting people for the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Sami Yousafzai’s interviews of Taliban people in the current Newsweek demonstrates how Bush Administration tactics alienated many and strengthened the Taliban. It is unlikely that the salutary change in course under General McCrystal can reverse the damage. Moreover, his turn toward the exercise of soft power -- economic and social development-- is all to the good, but this policy will require more time than we have. It can be recalled that it took John Paul Vann many years to work economic and social miracles in the Mekong Delta.
We frequently hear that anything less than a ramped up war in Afghanistan will damage U.S. credibility abroad. There may be some truth to this. Certainly other nations will not doubt that we have the ability to go anywhere and bring about massive destruction when we do not get our way. The real question should be “Does our national interest require expenditure of a great deal of blood and treasure in Afghanistan? “
A similarly weak argument is that we must prevent Afghanistan from becoming a failed state so that Al Qaeda will not use it as a base of operations. This wrongly assumes that there are no other failed states Al Qaeda can use as a base. Moreover, the terrorist organization appears to be unhampered in its operations in Pakistan. As General Jones has admitted, there is no reason why the Taliban would want to leave. He claims there are less than 100 Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.
Republicans could argue that the long term morale of our armed forces could be adversely effected if we did not escalate and then “win” in Afghanistan. The Vietnam War was devastating, and it took a long time for our military to restore its spirits. Right now, the military seems to be thinking in terms of “winning” and “loosing.” Its leadership should be educating our forces to think in terms of accomplishing limited goals.
Republican columnist Michael Gerson eschews the most simplistic arguments and admits the complexity of the situation in Afghanistan. Still, he senses that Obama is in a no-win situation. Gerson redefines the civilian-military relationship a bit by insisting that suggesting that tradition demands that Obama select his best general and get out of the way. He even mentions Harry S. Truman in this respect, though the use of that precedent can be debated. In the end, Abraham Lincoln accepted U.S. Grant’s meatgrinder approach, but he had been involved in many military decisions throughout the war. Another way to look at this is to recall that Lincoln bucked the popular George Mc Clellan and that Truman sacked th4e very popular Douglas Mc Arthur.
One can only wonder if any of the critics are concerned that the US be in a position to construct the long-desired twin pipelines down through Afghanistan to carry Caspian gas and oil to Pakistan and , by ship , to India. This was the object of a great deal of diplomacy before 9/11, and the Bush administration even resorted to the threat of bombings. The pipelines are in our national interest but it is doubtful if soldiers should lose their lives to get them.
Another Surge?
Those who insist that Obama bow to Petraeus and McCrystal is that they think that copying the surge strategy in Afghanistan will work. The surge worked best in the urban areas of Iraq, and there are few urban areas in Afghanistan. The surge also worked in Iraq because the United States literally bought off its enemies, paying large amounts to tribal leaders and monthly stipends to their armed retainers. Only Bob Woodward has openly discussed another reason why the surge worked. Special Forces in Iraq, under McCrystal, carried out something like the Vietnam War’s Operation Phoenix and eliminated thousands of the insurgent cadre.
Repeating some version of Phoenix in Afghanistan does not require a huge increase in American forces there. Over seven years, we have spent $38 billion in Afghanistan, with few discernable positive results. Perhaps more of the money sent there should be used to buy off warlords and put their troops on retainer. Its worth a try.
Should We Bet on Karzai?
We still come down to whether a large new commitment in human lives, money, and American prestige should be made in Afghanistan. Many Afghans believe that the present regime is hopelessly corrupt. The recent rigged election of August 20 is one indication of how weak the Karzai regime is. The UN found that one third of the votes cast for Karzai were fraudulent. The resultant acrimony has been so great that it is unrealistic to believe that Afghans can be unified around Karzai—no matter how many troops we send there. Karzai has not bothered to denounce those who rigged the election on his behalf. His reliance upon war lords and human rights abusers is not likely to win new grassroots supporters. Of course, policy makers recall that in Vietnam the elimination of the corrupt Ngo Dinh Diem resulted in even worse leaders.
The idea that we can, using soft power, somehow win over large numbers of Karzai opponents to support him is fanciful. The counter insurgency strategy has been based upon the idea that we could eventually build a large and effective Afghan army and matching police force. The Afghan army stands at 94,000 and has had a little success in the north. It will take two years to increase it to 134,000. That is still far short of the 300 or 400 thousand that are needed. Who can remember that there were 91,000 when George W. Bush began to rebuild the army. A rational person would look at these figures and conclude that Bush either the Republican administration had done poorly or it was unrealistic to expect rapid growth of that force. Our problems began when the Bushies somehow bungled the effort to nab Osama and then pulled out our most effective people so they could begin their adventure in Iraq. Any way you look at US policy there under Bush, it is impossible to conclude that anything was accomplished. Obama inherited a ticking time bomb but don’t look to any Republican politician or publicist to mention this. The truth is that it could be too late to do much there.
There is also the lesson of Vietnam, where we did build a large, well-equipped ARVIN force that was ineffective and heavily infiltrated by the enemy. There were also many “potted plants,” units that existed on paper but not in reality.
Unless Karzai abandons brutality and corrupt practices overnight and becomes a Boy Scout, the prospects of bringing much stability to Afghanistan are slim. The man is a Pashtun and that should have helped him with the nation’s largest ethnic group. Instead, the Taliban, also largely Pashtun, have been able to play on Pashtun nationalism to enlist support.
Effectively ending with Taliban jihadism may be beyond our ability. The Afghan Taliban practices jihad but only locally. They are only a threat to the United States unless they could again provide Al Qaeda with a base of operations. However, there is no reason for Al Qaeda to leave the Waziristan area of Pakistan, where they have the run of things and even have located families there. Though the Taliban previously sheltered Al Qaeda, many Taliban are not warm friends of the Arab-led terrorists, and it is possible that clever intelligence people could drive a wedge between them. It should also be remembered that many who call themselves Taliban in Afghanistan are simply insurgents capitalizing on that name. Many of them can be bought off.
The Pakis Will Play a Double Game
Pakistan will continue playing a double game—doing enough to get aid while keeping the Afghan Taliban alive. The best we can do is induce them to do more for us. Our primary goal there is to foster enough stability in Pakistan to keep the jihadists from getting their hands on the nation’s nuclear assets. That is no small job.
The Pakistani Army, though secular, long ago resorted to sponsoring Islamic jihadism as a means of countering Indian power. They built jihadist movements to threaten India in destabilizing Kashmir. In time, a jihadist opposition emerged in Pakistan itself, and the army officer corps now must deal with the fact that religious fanaticism has infected more than a few junior officers. Because Pakistan needs to have a strong influence in Afghanistan, Pakistani intelligence, the ISI, with the help of the United States, in the late 1970s and eighties, nurtured jihadism in Afghanistan. Many in Pakistan’s ISI—once closely tied to the CIA-- are not inclined to do anything to injure the Afghanistan Taliban, and they believe that United States will not be in Afghanistan indefinitely.
The only vital interest we have in the region is preventing the destabilization of Pakistan.
In part, that is because they have nuclear weapons. We would not want those weapons or that technology to fall into the hands of terrorists. There is little we can do directly to improve the situation in Pakistan. Until a month ago, we were spending 33 times as much in Afghanistan as in Pakistan. We have recently tripled what we spend in Pakistan, but more must be done. How we do it is ticklish. The Pakistan military loudly objected to the wording of our recent aid bill because it set performance standards for receiving installments of aid. Recently, five Taliban fighters entered the military headquarters in Rawalpindi, killed some soldiers, and held 22 people as hostages. Until recently, the Taliban controlled the Swat Valley, an important district.
Unless Pakistan can be induced to stop its help of the Afghan Taliban, a US counter insurgency program will require far more troops that McCrystal is now requesting. Afghans in the south and east already see the US as an occupying power, and the presence of more troops is certain to deepen that impression in those places and possibly spread it to the rest of the country. The Mc Crystal strategy would be an occupation, and foreign occupations of that country since the time of Alexander the Great have been failures. Simply put, occupations breed angr, and long occupations breed still more anger and violence.
In retrospect, it appears that most of the billions poured into Afghanistan were a poor investment. One leading member of Karzai’s coalition said he will withdraw if more American troops are committed. This man is an American ally but thinks that more troops would mobilize more people against the government.
Too much was filtered through foreign contractors. The money would have been better spent buying off the Pakistan generals and ISI and bringing greater political stability to Pakistan. Fortunately, Congress has just tripled its appropriation for Pakistan; but the amount is still relatively small.
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The Obama Administration wisely ended its war against the farmers growing poppies. It might be worthwhile to buy and destroy the Afghan opium crop. Using last year’s data, that might cost as much as $3.4 billion. This would not stop the Taliban from collecting taxes on it, but destruction of the whole crop would prevent the Taliban from moving large quantities of opium to the international market. That would cut their income by a third.
The situation in Afghanistan is very complex and unpromising. There are variables that the American public does not perceive. Do they know that many Afghans speak Persian and that they are strongly influenced by Iran? The latter could make things even worse for us but it has no reason now to want an unstable Afghanistan. Our dealings with Iran can impact upon what goes on in Afghanistan. By appearing to be more reasonable than Bush, President Obama has obtained some important concessions from Iran and may be able to do more. If Israel were to move against Iran, we could expect Iran to use its influence against us among its Afghan clients.
Richard Holbrooke has given us an idea of how bad the situation in Afghanistan is: “Its worse than the Nam!” It is very important that the American people understand what is involved here because a decision to make a long term commitment to pacification and nation-building will require years of commitment, massive amounts of money, and far more troops than we are now contemplating. Even with all that, there will be no guarantee that we can succeed in building a stable nation there. That is why House Minority Leader John Boehner is so angry that President Obama wants to take time making this decision. John Mc Cain has been busy claiming there is no difference between the Taliban and Al Qaeda in an effort to stampede Obama into waging a full scale war. If thoughtful independents come to understand much of what is involved, they might support Obama in redefining the mission there. Information is, as usual, the enemy of Republican policy here. The more people understand, the less damage Afghanistan will inflict on Obama’s political future.
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A Plug for Sherm’s Book
Sherm spent seven years writing an analytical chronicle of what the Republicans have been up to since the 1970s. It discusses elements in the Republican coalition, their ideologies, strategies, informational and financial resources, and election shenanigans. Abuses of power by the Reagan and G. W. Bush administration and the Republican Congresses are detailed. The New Republican Coalition : Its Rise and Impact, The Seventies to Present (Publish America) can be acquired by calling 301-695-1707. On line, go to http://www.publishamerica.com/shopping. It can also be obtained through the on-line operations of Amazon and Barnes and Noble. Do not consider purchasing it if you are looking for something that mirrors the mainstream media!
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